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We propose here a two-round relativistic bit commitment scheme where committer commits in 
the first round and then confirms his/her commitment in the second round. The scheme offers 
indefinite commitment time where both committer and receiver extract non-locally correlated 
measurement outcomes during the scheme that can be stored and revealed after arbitrarily long 
time. We show that the proposed scheme turns out to be a multiparty bit commitment scheme 
where both parties commit and reveal simultaneously. The multiparty generalization would have 
applications in business and secure multiparty computations such as managing joint bank 
account, holding joint shares in stock exchange and blind bidding. The same bit commitment 
scheme can also be used for the commitment of arbitrarily long classical bit strings. The scheme 
can be applied efficiently with existing technologies; entanglement is required only for time 
t=x/c where x is the special distance, can be as small as possible, between the committer and 
receiver. 
 
Introduction 
A bit commitment is an important cryptographic task between two mistrustful parties, a 
committer and a receiver. In general, committer commits to a specific bit by giving some 
information to the receiver and then unveils his/her commitment at some later time. Bit 
commitment is said to be unconditionally secure if it fulfils following security requirements: (i) 
receiver should not be able to extract the committed bit value during the scheme. (ii) When 
committer reveals, it must be possible for receiver to know the genuine bit value with absolute 
guarantee. (iii) Committer should not be able to reveal a bit different from the committed one.   
 In non-relativistic classical cryptography, secure bit commitment scheme based on 
unproven computational hardness is impossible. Similarly, non-relativistic quantum bit 
commitment schemes1-3 are also insecure against Mayers and Lo-Chau quantum attacks4-7 if 
committer and receiver do not pre-share any data.  
However, in relativistic cryptographic settings, both classical8,9 and quantum bit 
commitment protocols 10,11 have been presented and proved to be secure against general classical 
and quantum attacks12,13. Moreover, relativistic quantum bit commitment protocols have been 
experimentally demonstrated, using quantum communication and special relativity, with 
commitment times of 15ms14 and 30µs15, respectively. The commitment time is equivalent to the 
communication time between committer and one of the receiver’s agents. On the other hand, 
relativistic classical bit commitment protocol8 allows committer to commit for arbitrary duration 
but it requires multiple rounds with exponential increase in communication which makes it 
impractical. Recently, Lunghi et al proposed a relativistic classical multi-round bit commitment 
scheme16 with commitment time of 212ms, longer than communication time between the 
locations of the agents. 
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Recently, we proposed that combination of quantum non-locality and causality allows 
relativistic quantum cryptography to define many interesting mistrustful cryptographic tasks17-20 
that were previously considered to be impossible21-24. The general framework for relativistic 
quantum cryptography16 directly leads to (i) a new notion of OT where both the data transferred 
and the transfer position remain oblivious, (ii) deterministic two-sided TPSC, (iii) asynchronous 
ideal coin tossing with zero bias, and (iv) Unconditionally secure bit commitment with maximum 
commitment time of 2x/c while minimum commitment time of x/c
 
where x is the special distance 
between committer and receiver.  
These possibilities of wide range of cryptographic tasks in relativistic quantum 
cryptography show that relativity adds its weight, and hence gives more power, towards quantum 
cryptography. It motivates us to define more systematic and widely applicable bit commitment 
scheme based on relativistic quantum principles. For example, world is no longer divided 
between Alice and Bob but now we have a more complex, multi-party setting. The 
communication between these distant parties takes some finite time. So it is natural to ask how 
many parties can commit and reveal simultaneously. Another question would be to ask how long 
a commitment can sustain securely. More importantly, are multiple rounds of communication 
necessary to obtain arbitrarily long commitment time? In this article, we tried to address these 
questions and find very interesting answers.   
We propose here a delayed choice relativistic quantum commitment scheme where 
committer commits to a specific bit by sharing an EPR pair ij
 
with receiver in the first round. 
At some later time that comes from the scheme, committer applies unitary transformations jxizσσ
on his/her retained qubit and confirms her commitment by sending retained qubit to the receiver 
in second round. The proposed relativistic quantum scheme leads to (i) a secure commitment 
scheme between a committer and receiver. (ii) Secure commitment scheme between two parties 
where both commit and reveal simultaneously. The scheme validates commitments if both 
parties are fair otherwise aborts if any party tries to cheat. (iii) Commitment scheme for the 
commitment of arbitrarily long classical bit strings. (iv) Arbitrarily long commitment time. The 
multiparty bit commitment scheme would have applications in business such as managing joint 
bank account, holding joint shares in stock exchange and blind bidding. More generally, it can 
implement multiparty secure computation between distant parties. 
Interestingly, we found that arbitrarily long commitment time can be achieved securely 
by using only two-rounds of communication. Moreover committer and receiver do not need of 
quantum memory for storing quantum data for longer times; both committer and receiver extract 
non-locally correlated measurement outcomes in the commitment phase that can be stored and 
revealed after arbitrarily long time. Our scheme is purely relativistic quantum mechanical; it does 
not require any classical communication between committer and receiver.  
 
Space time geometry and security criteria 
Suppose committer, receiver and their agents have secure point like laboratories at priorly 
announced positions in Minkowski space time. Both parties can securely communicate quantum 
information with their respective agents by sending signals at speed of light c. The time for 
information processing at their laboratories is assumed to be negligibly small as compared to 
communication time between them.  
The proposed scheme attains unconditional security through combination of quantum 
non-local correlations generated by entanglement swapping25,26 and then teleportation27 over 
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swapped entangled quantum systems. We denote four Bell states as 00=+ζ , 01=+η , 10=−ζ  
and 11=−η  while qubits of these Bell pairs as },{ 0αα  in case of Alice and },{ 0ββ  if Bob 
prepares any one of these Bell states.  
                                               2
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                                               2
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                                               2
1001
11
−
==
−η
                                                            (1.4) 
Security definition-I: Suppose two parties A and B share their secretly prepared EPR pairs 
0αα  and 0ββ
 
with a third party C respectively. If C applies Bell state measurement (BSM) on 
0α  and 0β , A and B gets entangled in one of the Bell states αβ  whose exact identity 
remains unknown to all three parties unless they communicate and gather their secret 
information at one point in their causal future.  
 Here Bell state 0αα  is known only to Alice while 0ββ  to Bob. By performing 
measurement of Bell operator26 on qubits 0α  and 0β , C projects initial system 00 ββαα ⊗  
into αββα ⊗00  where Bell state 00βα  is known only to C. If ±± ⊗=⊗ ζζββαα 00  or 
±± ⊗=⊗ ηηββαα 00  then  
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−−−−++++ ⊗+⊗+⊗+⊗=⊗→⊗ ηηζζηηζζαββαββαα
         (2.1) 
If ±± ⊗=⊗ ηζββαα 00  or ±± ⊗=⊗ ζηββαα 00  then  
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If mζζββαα ⊗=⊗ ±00  or mηηββαα ⊗=⊗ ±00  then  
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If mηζββαα ⊗=⊗ ±00  or mζηββαα ⊗=⊗ ±00  then  
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1
0000
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Equations (2.1)-(2.4) show that regardless of the initially shared Bell states 0αα  and 0ββ , four 
Bell state measurement outcomes },,,{00 −−++∈ ηζηζβα  on C side are equally likely, each with 
probability of ¼. Hence, the exact identity of αβ
 
can only be known to someone who knows all 
three Bell states 0αα , 0ββ  and 00βα . Security definition-I holds true even if A and C or B 
and C collaborate. 
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Security definition-II: Suppose two parties A and B share an EPR pair αβ
 
whose exact 
identity is unknown to both A and B. If A teleports a quantum state ϕ
 
prepared in publically 
known orthogonal basis to B by performing measurement of Bell operator26 on state ϕ  and 
entangled qubit α , he gets one of the Bell states },,,{ −−++ ηζηζ
 
while B’s entangled half 
becomes ϕσψ i= . The Pauli encoding },,,{ xzzxi I σσσσσ ∈
 
remains unknown to both A and 
B unless they communicate and gather information ψ , ϕ
 
and exact Bell state measurement 
outcome },,,{ −−++ ηζηζ
 
at one point in their causal future. If +=ζαβ  
 
then  
                                  
)(
2
1 ϕσσηϕσζϕσηϕζαβϕ zxzx ⊗+⊗+⊗+⊗=⊗ −−++               (3.1) 
If +=ηαβ  
 
then  
                                  
)(
2
1 ϕσηϕσσζϕηϕσζαβϕ zzxx ⊗+⊗+⊗+⊗=⊗ −−++               (3.2) 
If −=ζαβ  
 
then  
                                  
)(
2
1 ϕσηϕζϕσσηϕσζαβϕ xzxz ⊗+⊗+⊗+⊗=⊗ −−++               (3.3) 
If −=ηαβ  
 
then  
                                  
)(
2
1 ϕηϕσζϕσηϕσσζαβϕ ⊗+⊗+⊗+⊗=⊗ −−++ xzzx               (3.4) 
It shows that regardless of the initially shared Bell state αβ , four Bell state measurement 
outcomes },,,{ −−++ ηζηζ
 
on Alice side and hence four possibilities of Pauli encoding iσ  on 
Bob’s entangled half are equally likely, each with probability of ¼. Hence, the exact identity of 
Pauli encodings iσ  can only be known to someone who knows both quantum information ψ , 
ϕ
 
and one of the foul possible Bell state measurement outcome },,,{ −−++ ηζηζ . Security 
definition-II holds true even if ϕ
 
is known to both A and B. 
 
Delayed choice Relativistic quantum bit commitment scheme 
In the proposed delayed choice relativistic quantum bit commitment scheme committer commits 
to a specific bit by sharing an EPR pair ij
 
with receiver in the first round. At some later time 
that comes from the scheme, committer applies unitary transformations jxizσσ
 
on his/her retained 
qubit and confirms her commitment by sending retained qubit to the receiver in second round. 
The relativistic quantum bit commitment scheme can be used to imply single-party commitment 
scheme and multiparty party commitment scheme with arbitrarily long commitment time and 
choice of committed data; single scheme works for the commitment of both single bit and 
commitment of arbitrarily long classical bit stings.   
Code: Let’s suppose measurement basis {0,1} are known to both Alice and Bob (priorly decided 
somewhere in their causal past) and they use the following code: Bell states },{ −+∈ ζζζ
 
correspond to classical 2-bit string }10,00{21 ∈dd
 
(or classical bit 02 == ddc ) while those of 
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},{ −+∈ ηηη
 
correspond to classical 2-bit string }11,01{21 ∈dd (or classical bit 12 == ddc ). That 
is, committer commits herself to the bit value 0=cd  or 1=cd  by preparing EPR pair 
},{ −+∈ ζζζ  or },{ −+∈ ηηη .  
Single-party commitment scheme: Suppose receiver Bob, his agent B0 and committer Alice are 
space like separated and occupy secure locations (0,0), (x,0) and (2x,0) in Minkowski space time 
respectively. Suppose Bob and his agent B0 secretly agree on a Bell pair 0ββ  and quantum state 
}1,0{∈ϕ
 
somewhere in their causal past unknown to committer Alice. Explicit procedure for bit 
commitment scheme between committer Alice and receiver Bob is described below: 
Phase-I, t=0: Both committer Alice and receiver Bob share Bell pairs },{0 ηζαα ∈  and 
},{0 ηζββ ∈
 
with B0 respectively. By doing this, Alice commits herself to a 2-bit string 0αα . 
Phase-II, t=x/c: B0 performs BSM on qubits 0α  and 0β  in his possession and stores classical 
BSM result 00bb ′ . This measurement of B0 projects the qubits in possession of Alice and Bob into 
one of the Bell states },,,{ −−++∈ ηζηζαβ . Simultaneously, Bob teleports a quantum state
}1,0{∈ϕ
 to Alice and sends his BSM result bb ′  to B0 securely. As a result, Alice’s half α  
becomes one of the corresponding four possible states ϕσψ i=
 
where iσ
 
is teleportation 
encoding. Instantly, Alice applies unitary operator 0αασσ xz
 
on her qubit α  and confirms her 
commitment by sending ϕσσσψ αα ixz 0=′
 
to B0. 
Phase-III, t=2x/c: B0 measures ψ ′
 
in the {0,1} basis and stores result ψ ′ . 
Phase-IV, t=T: Alice reveals her commitment by announcing identity of 0αα  at some time t=T 
of her choice. Now B0 can find the exact identity of swapped entangled state αβ , and (hence) 
the exact teleportation encoding iσ . If Alice’s announcement is consistent with non-locally 
correlated Pauli encoding iσ , B0 validates Alice commitment otherwise aborts.  
 
Figure 1: Relativistic quantum bit commitment scheme between committer Alice and receiver 
Bob and his agent B0. At priorly agreed time t=0, Alice makes a commitment by sharing 0α  
with B0 and confirms her commitment by sending ϕσσσψ αα ixz 0=′
 
to B0 at some later time 
t=x/c. Solid arrows represent flying qubits, dotted arrow shows teleportation while dashed arrow 
represents classical information secured by quantum channel between Bob and his agent. 
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We would like to highlight here that even though Alice shares EPR pair 0αα  with B0 at 
time t=0 to make initial commitment, her commitment gets mature at time t=x/c when B0 
receives 0α , Bob teleports ϕ
 
to Alice, and Alice applies 0αασσ xz on her qubit α  and returns 
to Bob. That is, Alice have a choice and can change her commitment (EPR pair) during the time 
laps from t=0 to t=x/c by applying specific Pauli transformations on retained qubit α  and it 
cannot be considered as successful cheating. However, after time t=x/c when she returns 
ψσσψ αα 0xz=′
 
to B0 and confirms her commitment, it is impossible for Alice to alter her 
commitment.  
Multiparty-commitment scheme: Suppose Alice and Bob are space like separated and occupy 
secure locations (0,0) and (2x,0) in Minkowski space time respectively. In the commitment 
phase, both Alice and Bob commit simultaneously by sharing an EPR pair with authority C at 
position (x,0). Here authority C is assumed to be a joint center (stock exchange) where both 
Alice and Bob have their representatives A0 and B0 respectively. Any information that is sent 
from Alice and Bob at center C is accessible to both A0 and B0. All the quantum operations 
performed at center C are assumed to be performed jointly by A0 and B0. However, no cheating 
strategies can be applied on flying quantum information from Alice and Bob to center C; A0 and 
B0 (or authority C) can securely communicate with respective agencies Alice and Bob. Explicit 
procedure for multiparty commitment is described below: 
Phase-I, t=0: Both Alice and Bob share randomly chosen EPR pairs },{0 ηζαα ∈  and 
},{0 ηζββ ∈
 
with C respectively. By doing this, they commits themselves to 2-bit strings 0αα
and 0ββ  respectively.  
Phase-II, t=x/c: C performs BSM on qubits in his possession, stores classical BSM result cc ′  in 
his memory and broadcast the result as well. This measurement of C
 
projects the qubits in 
possession of Alice and Bob into Bell states },,,{ −+−+∈ ηηζζαβ . Simultaneously, Bob teleports 
a publically known state { }1,0∈ϕ  (either 0=ϕ
 
or 1=ϕ ) to Alice and gets two classical bits 
bb ′ . As a result, Alice’s half α  becomes one of the corresponding four possible states 
ϕσψ i=
 
where teleportation encoding },,,{ xzzxi I σσσσσ ∈
 
is unknown to Alice, Bob and C. 
Instantly, Alice measures her qubit α  in {0,1} basis, applies unitary operators 0αασσ xz
 
and 
returns ϕσσσψ αα ixz 0=′
 
to center C. Similarly, Bob sends ϕσσσσϕ ββ 0xzbxbz ′=′  at center C. At 
this stage, time t=x/c, both Alice and Bob confirm their commitments 0αα and 0ββ  encoded over 
ψ ′
 
and ϕ ′
 
respectively.  
Phase-III, t=2x/c: C measures ψ ′
 
and ϕ ′
 
in the {0,1} basis and stores outcome ψ ′and ϕ′ . 
Phase-IV, t=T: At some agreed time t=T, both Alice and Bob reveal their commitments by 
announcing identities of 0αα  and 0ββ  (and bb ′ ) respectively. Now C can find the exact identity 
of swapped entangled state αβ , and (hence) the exact teleportation encoding iσ . If 
announcements of Alice and Bob are consistent with non-local correlations, C
 
validates their 
commitments otherwise aborts.  
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Figure 2: Relativistic quantum multiparty bit commitment scheme between Alice and Bob. C 
represents a joint center where both Alice and Bob have their representatives A0 and B0 
respectively. At priorly agreed time t=0, both Alice and Bob make commitments by sharing 0α  
and 0β  with C. Both Alice and Bob confirm their commitment by sending ϕσσσψ αα ixz 0=′
 
and ϕσσσσϕ ββ 0xzbxbz ′=′  to C at some later time t=x/c. Solid arrows represent flying qubits 
while dotted arrow shows teleportation. 
 
Security Analysis 
Our scheme is purely relativistic quantum mechanical; it does not require any classical 
communication between committer and receiver and hence is secure from classical attacks by 
definition. As for as quantum attacks are concerned, quantum non-local correlations guarantee 
that the scheme is perfectly concealed and receiver cannot predict or extract committed bit before 
the opening from committer. Similarly, it guarantees receiver that committer cannot change her 
committed bit after his/her confirmation since there comes a unique Bell state after Bell 
measurement over initially shared committed Bell states and hence unique Pauli encoding from 
teleportation over swapped Bell state.  
Instead of giving detailed security proof, we argue here that our proposed scheme is 
secure purely on the basis of rules of relativistic quantum theory. Repetitive measurements at the 
secure laboratories of Alice, Bob and their agents (center C) ensure security against Mayers and 
Lo-Chau quantum attacks4-7 attacks.  Repetitive measurements in priorly agreed basis ensure that 
quantum states ϕ , ϕ′ , and ψ ′  are no more entangled and hence cheating party cannot delay 
(restricted by no-signaling and measurement of time lapse) or alter his/her commitment by 
applying unitary transformations. Furthermore, measurements in agreed basis allow both parties 
to know each other’s commitment in the revealing phase with surety; authority C cannot 
announce biased outcome since both parties have stored non-locally correlated measurement 
outcomes. 
Moreover, in multiparty commitment scheme, we assume that both committer and 
receiver commit and reveal their commitment simultaneously. This element of simultaneity does 
not compromise security since flying qubits from Alice and Bob to center C are perfectly 
encrypted through quantum one-time pad28,29. Hence neither party can extract any useful 
information, and hence cannot change his/her commitment accordingly, about committed bit of 
other party.  
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 Since, 0=ϕ
 
and 1=ϕ
 
are eigenstates of both Pauli operators I and zσ , hence 
equations (2.1), (2.3), (3.1) and (3.3) show that committer can change his/her committed 2-bit 
string from 0021 =dd  to 1021 =dd  by announcing initially prepared Bell state 
−ζ
 
instead of +ζ
 
or vice versa. Since ϕσσϕσψ iziI ==′ , receiver cannot detect cheating committer if 0=ϕ
 
or 1=ϕ . However it will not be considered as successful cheating since both Bell state −ζ
 
and 
+ζ
 
or 0021 =dd  and 1021 =dd
 
represents same committed bit 0=cd according to code. 
Similarly, equations (2.2), (2.4), (3.2) and (3.4) show that committer can announce −η
 
instead of 
+η or vice versa where both Bell states −η
 
and +η  represent same committed bit 1=cd  and 
ϕσσσϕσσψ ixzix ==′
 
if 0=ϕ
 
or 1=ϕ .  However, from equations (2.1)-(2.4) and (3.1)-
(3.4), it can be seen that committer cannot change his/her initially prepared Bell state from ±ζ
 
to 
±η . Hence he/she cannot change his/her commitment from }10,00{21 =dd  to }11,01{21 =dd  or 
committed bit from 0=cd  to 1=cd . 
 Finally, what if receiver Bob and his agent B0 perform not a single designated action in 
the first round of single-party bit commitment scheme and wait for second round to extract 
committed bit from Alice? That is neither B0 performs Bell measurement on 0α  and 0β  nor 
Bob teleports state ϕ
 
to Alice. The confirmation of commitment through unitary 
transformations 0αασσ xz
 
on her retained half α
 
guarantees Alice that B0 cannot extract exact 
identity of αα0  through Bell measurement on 0α  and ασσ
αα 0
xz .  
    
Commitments of classical bit strings: Instead of committing single-bit 0=cd  to 1=cd , Alice 
can commit classical 2-bit strings 10,01,0021 =ccdd  or 11  by sharing an EPR pair 00=
+ζ ,
01=+η , 10=−ζ  or 11=−η  with Bob’s agent B0 respectively. The single-party scheme can be 
modified for commitment of any one of classical 2-bit strings }11,10,01,00{21 =ccdd
 
with following 
code:  
Code: Suppose Bob and his agent B0 secretly decide quantum state ϕ  prepared in measurement 
basis {0,1,+.-} somewhere in their causal past unknown to committer Alice. To commit classical 
2-bit string 00, 01, 10, or 11, Alice shares an EPR pair 00=+ζ , 01=+η , 10=−ζ  or 11=−η  
with Bob’s agent B0 respectively.  
 If Alice wants to commit one of four classical 2-bit strings 00,01,10,11, Bob teleports 
},,1,0{ −+∈ϕ
 to Alice at time t=x/c. Since Alice does not know whether }1,0{∈ϕ
 
(eigenstates of 
I
 
and zσ ) or },{ −+∈ϕ (eigenstates xσ and zxσσ ), she cannot measure/store her retained 
entangled half now in the state ϕσψ i= . If Alice tries to cheat by announcing Bell state 0αα ′′  
different from initially shared 0αα , her success probability will only be ½ since there are only 
50% chance that ϕσσσϕσσσ αααα ixzixz 00 =′′ . If N entangled states are used, Alice can commit for 
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2N classical bit string N02010 .......... αααααα  where Alice’s cheating probability 
asymptotically goes to zero; 02/1 →N for large N.  
 
Applications 
Outcomes of the proposed relativistic quantum commitment scheme such as indefinite 
commitment time, commitment of arbitrarily long bit strings, and allowing multiparty 
commitments would have a number of applications in business and secure multiparty 
computation as follows.  
Joint bank accounts: Alice and Bob can be considered as two users of joint account at bank C. 
Both Alice and Bob commit with each other and with bank C by sharing their Bell pairs and later 
confirming their willing (committed bit cd ) to bank. In view of commitments from both account 
holders, bank C can release or halt transactions to anyone of these parties or both.  
Stock exchange: Alice and Bob can be treated as two business companies who want to invest 
jointly for certain shares in stock exchange but each have interest in keeping his/her share secret 
from other. They can commit at stock exchange simultaneously and later open their 
commitments without distressing each other’s interests. They cannot enhance or reduce their 
shares by looking their interests in current market trends but can take decisions only that are 
allowed by the protocol; they can invest either one of 0021 =dd  and 1021 =dd  if initially 
committed to bit 0=cd
 
or one of 0121 =dd  and 1121 =dd  if initially committed to bit 1=cd . 
Blind bidding: Suppose authority C announces bidding for some of his articles. Alice and Bob 
are two distant competitors (bidders) who are asked to blindly bid for those articles without 
knowing each other’s bid. They secretly share their concealed bids (commitments) by sending 
entangled halves of their Bell states },{0 ηζαα ∈  and },{0 ηζββ ∈
 
to C respectively.  At the end 
of the protocol, C announces which party has won the bidding by publically announcing final 
outcome that comes from pre-defined rule. Here Alice or Bob can challenge the authority C if 
he/she founds that announcement of winner was biased.   
Multiparty secure computation: More generally, proposed scheme can be used for multiparty 
secure computation without assuming any bound on the corrupt competitors (Alice and Bob) or 
authority (C). At the end of the scheme, input from each party remains secret while everyone 
knows a definite outcome. That is, the authority C can validate or abort the committed bit 0=cd  
to 1=cd
 
and announce the outcome but cannot extract whether cd has come from }10,00{21 =dd  
or }11,01{21 =dd .  
 
Discussion 
We proposed a delayed choice relativistic bit commitment scheme that enhances commitment 
time to be arbitrarily long and can be used for multiparty commitment where both parties commit 
and reveal simultaneously. The same commitment scheme can also be used for the commitment 
of arbitrarily long classical bit strings. The unconditional security from both committer and 
receiver comes through non-local quantum correlation generated by very fundamental and 
important quantum information tasks, entanglement swapping and teleportation.  
 In the previously proposed relativistic bit commitment schemes, authors tried to enhance 
commitment time either through multiple rounds of communications or by enhancing 
communication time by taking large distance between committer and receiver. However, our 
proposed relativistic quantum bit commitment scheme gives arbitrarily long commitment time by 
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using only two round of communication while distance x between committer and receiver can be 
as small as possible.  
 The proposed relativistic scheme is practical and can be efficiently applied for arbitrarily 
long commitment time with existing technologies without requiring long term quantum 
memories or maintaining coherence over distant quantum channels. Repetitive measurements 
allow to store measurement outcomes that are non-locally correlated with initially prepared 
entangled states; entanglement is required only for time t=x/c where x is the special distance 
between the committer and receiver.  
Hopefully, practically relevant outcomes from this scheme will shed light on relationship 
between quantum information theory, especially quantum cryptography, with relativistic 
quantum theory.        
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